A SYMPOSIUM OF CRITICAL
LEGAL STUDIES
INTRODUCTION*
JAMES BoYLE**

Recently there has been a great deal of loose talk and brouhaha
about critical legal studies. Several symposia have been devoted to
the distinctly unplayful task of defining this mysterious animal. This
Symposium is not one of them. Instead it is a collection of Articles
about some of the subjects dear to the hearts of critical legal scholars, a collection which reflects the diversity of methods and objectives that are subsumed under the vague label of "critical legal
scholarship."'
* So here it is. All of the themes beloved of critical legal scholars are represented-the
undermining of false necessity, the idea that legal interpretation is not, and could not be,
objective, the application of feminist criticism to an intellectual field which has been viewed
for a long time as inherently "male," the politics of the classroom, the effect of reification in
legal doctrine and economic theory, and the empowerment of students, the contingency of
social constructs-and so on, and so on. "It's turtles all the way down," as the amateur
cosmologist said to William James.
** © 1985 James Boyle
1. All of the Articles in this Symposium, with the exception of those by MaryJoe Frug
and Duncan Kennedy, were produced in a seminar which went by the unprepossessing name
of "Modem Legal Theory." Although my name appeared on the course catalogue as the
teacher of this seminar, it was in fact taught jointly by all of the people in the class. The
students in the seminar had all taken myJurisprudence course and they were egging me on to
put together an advanced seminar that would go deeper into the roots of the legal theories we
had discussed in the Jurisprudence class, and would also allow us to practice what I had been
preaching about the desirability of nonhierarchical teaching and learning. Each person would
pick a topic, prepare reading materials on it, teach it to (or with) the class, and finally write an
article on it. We would put together a symposium out of the works produced, invite the participation of a few outside authors, and offer the resulting collection to a law review. I
thought that this method might help us to get around the implicit denigration of all forms of
student-generated scholarship apart from notes, comments and analyses ofwhat the Supreme
Court has been up to. It seems almost impossible to get any kind of original scholarly work
published when you are a student, unless your writing fits neatly into one of the aforementioned categories. Even critical legal studies symposia, always full of references to the disempowerment of students, hardly ever have articles by students themselves.
Of the seminar itself, there is too much to say. We studied feminism, structuralism, marxism, legal realism, and all of those things again with the requisite "post-s" and "neo-s." We
read Levi-Strauss, Focault, Barthes, Wittgenstein, Derrida, Hobbes, Locke, Hegel, Nietzsche,
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The only trouble with the claim I have just made is that is seems
to be denied by the contents page. How can one claim that there is
anything common to all of the Articles presented here, given the
eclectic range of subjects on which they concentrate? There is an
Article about the suppression of the "female voice" in the classroom, about the cumulative anaesthesia produced by the intersection of economic and legal thought in the nineteenth century, about
the politics and techniques of a tort class, about a feminist reading
of a first-year casebook, about the Freedom of Information Act,
about the fourth amendment and the public/private distinction,
about the metonymics of sexual and legal repression and about cls
and Wittgenstein. What could such a range of articles possibly
share and what are "metonymics," anyway?
Skipping blithely over the dangers of proposing common themes,
I want to argue that all of these Articles can usefully be seen as all
dealing with false necessity. By "false necessity," I mean the apparent inevitability of existing arrangements, the way that "what is"
gets converted into "what ought to be." I have argued elsewhere
for the usefulness of seeing critical legal scholarship in this light, but
for the moment my aim is only to bring out a tactical similarity in
each of these Articles. The similarity is the attempt to show the
political and other choices that are suppressed beneath the surface
of the activity in question.
Duncan Kennedy uses an interpretation of Marx's Essay on The Fetishism of Commodities as the lead into a series of Essays that deal with
the reification of "the market." Seen in this light, the interlocking
activity of the classical (and neoclassical) lawyers and economists has
something in common with the way Marx described the mystification of "value." The link is not that "its all a capitalist plot," but
rather that, in both cases, the result is to imbue a system made by
human beings with "fateful objectivity" and thus to conceal its actual malleability as well as insulating it from change.
Marx, Gramsci, Lukacs, Sartre, Melville, Kafka, Woolf, Vonnegut, Breton, (E.P.) Thompson,

Gilligan, Dinnerstein, and Marbury v. Madison. We studied the Code of Professional Responsibility, compared Italian futurism to legal realism, argued about "comparable worth" and
analyzed the internal logic of nuclear deterrence theories. We read Blackstone, (and Kennedy
on Blackstone), as well as Coke, Bacon, Holmes, Cohen (Morris and Felix), Fuller, Hart, Hale,
Ely, Tribe, Tushnet, Klare, Brest, Horwitz, Gabel, Michaelman, and Posner. (And if you don't
know what half of these names mean, then you are in the same position most of us were in at
the begining of the class).
The most important thing about the seminar, however, was not the number of famous
scholars, live or dead, whose work we ingested. It was the way the seminar worked. There is
too much to say about that, as well. But one point is worth making. This class, in its own little
way, violated all the standard norms of law school discipline. ("You've got to have an instructor to keep things moving," "People with busy schedules only do the assignments that they
will be punished for not doing," etc.) But it worked.
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My own Article is, as its title suggests, the anatomy of a torts
course that I taught. My aim in writing it was to violate the implict
ban against scholarship about teaching and, thus, to demonstrate
the range of implicit messages about law, history, legal argument
and professional ideology that are conveyed in the classroom. I take
up Duncan Kennedy's themes of the reification of "the market," the
impact of the public/private distinction, and the interlocking nature
of legal and economic visions and relate them to tort doctrine as it is
presented in a first year class. By juxtaposing a series of narratives
about the class with an analysis of the things I was trying to teach, I
have attempted to produce an example of "local theory," rather
than merely talking about the desirability of such a thing. Included
as an appendix to the Article is the analysis of legal arguments that I
handed out to my class with the aim of teaching an indispensable
skill while simultaneously demystifying legal discourse.
MaryJoe Frug's Essay, Re-Reading Contracts: A FeministAnalysis of a
Contracts Casebook, continues the themes of feminist theory and of the
politics of teaching. As teachers or casebook writers, we may imagine that our texts say just what they appear to; they speak in a calm
monotone about the subjects we are studying, are "heard" to do so
by everyone in their prospective audience, and convey no extraneous messages about the world or our conception of people within it.
By describing a set of hypothetical readers, and then taking sections
of the casebook and discussing them from various gendered perspectives, Mary Joe demonstrates that the gendered readings she
describes can be the basis for different ways of understanding everything from ourselves to legal doctrine.
K.C. Worden's Article deals with the unconscious assumption that
one moral "voice" is inherently suited to the study and practice of
law. Drawing on the work of Roland Barthes and Carol Gilligan,
K.C. uses a series of "microphenomenological accounts" or "stories" (pick your jargon) to show the suppression of the "female
voice" in law school. From Barthes she takes the idea that the most
powerful ideologies may be those that don't even appear to be ideologies----"that which goes without saying." Barthes' technique was
to focus on these ideas and ideologies as they appeared in the most
unlikely and "innocent" places-professional wrestling, guide
books, photographs of a soldier saluting the tricoleur, the design of
childrens' toys-and K.C. does the same for law schools. She looks
at such phenomena as "double-bolding" in Gilbert's, the appropriate clothing for a moot court competition, and the implicit limits of
classroom discussion. From Carol Gilligan she takes the idea of the
"female voice"-a distinct approach to moral problems and to rea-
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soning in general which, Gilligan claims, has been ignored by theories of moral and psychological development. By combining the two
techniques-Gilligan's model of "female voice" rationality and
Barthes' phenomenological critique of ideology-K.C. can explore
the internal politics of legal education in a way that appeals directly
to our experience of life.
John Moon's Article takes up the question of the relationship between liberal state theory and the claim that law is neutral and objective. Taking the Freedom of Information Act as an illustration,
he uses Duncan Kennedy's idea of "the fundamental contradiction"
to expose both the central tasks of legal doctrine, and the recurring
tensions that prevent it from fulfilling that task. The "fundamental
contradiction between Self and Others" is a sort of algebraic version
of liberal state theory. The recurrent tension between my need and
my fear of others is going to be mediated by the state. The state will
allow good interactions, grease the wheels of commerce, protect the
polity, and it will also discourage bad interactions (criminal, or tortious). In other words, the state acts as a kind of filter between Self
and Other, letting through only those kinds of contact which we
wish to encourage.
But what is to prevent the state, itself, from becoming a nasty and
threatening "Other"-dominating me, taking away my property and
so on? It is precisely because the state has been given such an important role to play that it is an object of such fear in the liberal
world view. The idea of objective, apolitical law is the conceptual
device by which we are supposed to dissolve this fear. The state will
be bound and restrained by the rule of law, and it in turn, will regulate my relationships with Others according to our respective legal
rights. Thus, the success of the state's mediating role appears to
depend on the viability of some kind of neutral legal interpretation,
otherwise all those nasty fights between Self and Others are simply
going to reappear as we consider which policy, right, interpretation,
or interest, is going to win in the case at hand. John shows that the
Freedom of Information Act is a classic example of the struggle to
maintain some convincing version of this kind of apolitical legal interpretation. As we go through the statutory exemptions, all of the
doctrinal techniques are trotted out-we have some "plain meaning," some "purposive interpretation," some "delimitation of
spheres of power," and so on. Of course, these techniques are actually the ones acquired so painfully in first year (for details, see the
articles by K.C., MaryJoe and myself) and soJohn's piece allows us
to make the connection between the analysis of pedagogy and the
ideological structure of legal argument.
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So the doctrinal methods described earlier as features of the first
year experience, reappear as attempts to make law seem neutral and
thus to deal with a basic issue in liberal state theory. John's claim is
that we would be mistaken to rely on this conception of law and
state; first, because we would fool ourselves into believing that we
already had an adequate government disclosure system and, second,
because we should be focusing instead on the contradiction that this
legal theory is supposed to deny-in the same way that a patient undergoing analysis uses the surface structures of her mechanisms of
denial to work out what it is that is really being denied. Once one
sees the liberal picture of the hopes and fears of the polity as only
one among many possible versions, one can begin to ask such questions as; are we right to focus so exclusively on the fear of public
power? Aren't there excesses of "private" power that are potentially just as dangerous, but which are rendered invisible in the liberal vision of the world? Once again the central topic of the piece is
the "false necessity" produced by a particular social and conceptual
system-the way a particular view of the world simply makes some
political conflicts invisible.
Don Pongrace's Article continues the discussion of the impossibility of contructing a system of neutral legal interpretation. Like
John, he sees law as a mediating device, one that mediates not only
between the state and the citizen, but also between conflicting visions of personality contained in liberal theory and worked out in
legal doctrine. The Article examines the legal delimitation, in the
context of fourth amendment doctrine, of the line between the
"public" and "private" spheres of human activity.
We talk airily about the public sphere and the private sphere as
though those mysterious entities were both self-defining and selfcontained. But, as is pointed out in some of the earlier Articles in
the Symposium, this is far from being the case. For example, when
juxtaposed with the state, the marketplace is supposed to be private,
whereas, whenjuxtaposed with the family, the marketplace comes to
be seen as the world of public, instrumental rationality, potentially
dangerous to the "private," nurturing world of family and home.
Don is dealing with an area of law that is conceived around, though
by no means limited to, the vision of the family and the home (and,
by analogy, the zone of privacy) as being fragile entities, in need of
strong constitutional protection from a potentially intrusive state.
Thus, because of both its conceptual framework and its history,
fourth amendment doctrine is a uniquely suitable example of the
enterprise of protecting a particular-albeit contradictory-vision of
"the good life," as that vision is expressed in legal doctrine.
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In his introductory sections Don exposes the process by which
particular methods of legal analysis come to be associated with particular legal/political aims. This happens on both a small scale (liberals used to think that formalism was inherently conservative, but
now want to use formalist arguments to protect the legacy of the
Warren court) and a large scale (the belief that only by having a
neutral system for legal interpretation can we protect our constitutional rights). Using fourth amendment doctrine as the example,
Don argues that the fixation on objectivity derives in part from the
fact that our most basic political and legal concepts contain contradictory visions of human nature and of the good life, and that legal
doctrine is supposed to freeze these contradictory conceptions in
some miraculous harmony. He concludes by claiming that we would
be better to renounce these pretensions of objectivity-both in our
jurisprudence and in our practices ofjudicial appointment. Instead
of having two contradictory pictures of judges (as beneficiaries of
political patronage at, and neutral logicians after, appointment) we
should take seriously the idea that judges are polemical social theorists, and try to make them good social theorists.
If Don Pongrace's Article examines the process by which conceptions of personality are objectified by the legal system, Judy Harris'
Article deals with objectification and with law, from a slightly differ-

ent angle. Judy focuses on metonymy, the figure of speech by which
a part comes to stand for the whole. For example, "The Pentagon"
comes to stand for the military institutions, people and political
forces who carry on their "business" in that building, among others.
Metonymy gets its power from the fact that a choice is concealed,
the choice of which part to use to symbolize the whole. It is by analyzing this choice-by asking "what would you have to think, to
think that this represented the essential element of the thing por-

trayed?"-that one can expose the "false necessity" conveyed by
metonymy, whether it is used in legal doctrine or in casual conversation. The interesting thing is the realization that sexist labels for
women and legal categorizations use the same rhetorical technique,
are examples of the same figure of speech.
This is not, of course, to say that the sexist and the legal metonymies are equally reprehensible; it is merely to point out that they
both conceal political choices in the same way, because they both
have the same conceptual structure. Both take a totality (a person
and a social conflict) and abstract out that which is taken to be "of
the essence" given the implicit background choice made in that particular field of discourse. The sexist sees women as sexual objects,
but the question of whether there are other, better, views of the
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world is foreclosed. The lawyer or judge sees the categories as already set up, and thinks that no choice is necessary to operate within
them. "And, neither there is!" you might respond. ButJudy argues
that this is not the case. By using choice-of-law examples, she shows
that the decision as to which law governs may depend on legal categorization. "Is this a contracts issue or a torts issue?" But what are
the purposes, the choices behind the decision to divide the world into
contract and tort? They may be entirely irrelevant to any of the policies or reasons that would make us want to give a case to jurisdiction a or jurisdiction b. By coming at this familiar legal realist
criticism of traditional conflicts analysis from a linguistic perspective, Judy exposes a link between legal and social criticism-the critique of reification.
Stephen Brainerd's piece concentrates on the relationship between Wittgenstein, cls, and structuralism. The description I have
just given makes his Article appear to be the most "philosophical"-and thus the most off-putting to those who aren't terribly sure who
Wittgenstein was, or why they should care about structuralism.
Both reactions would be misplaced, I think.
Why is Wittgenstein important? First, the way that he writes.
Rather than lay out an abstract argument about the operation of language, Wittgenstein gives us hundreds of little numbered anecdotes, gnomic examples of the ways that language works, and the
ways that it does not. Something in this procedure should be familiar to lawyers. I have frequently been puzzled by the question of
why legal scholarship is now so in tune with the current preoccupations of philosophers and literary critics. I now think that the answer to this question is intimately connected to the familiarity of
Wittgenstein's method. Lawyers are "good at" deconstruction because, rather than talking in the abstract about how texts are infinitely manipulable, they are actually engaged in the manipulating
exercise. Seen in this light Wittgenstein has a connection to, of all
things, the Socratic case-method, as well as to other rather more
fancy philosophical movements-the idea of "local theory" mentioned at the end of this introduction, for example.
So the first interesting thing about Wittgenstein is his method-a
vision of theory as a lot of little ideas that work. The second idea,
and the one that Stephen concentrates on more heavily in his Artide, is tied up with the notion of linguistic indeterminacy. We can
get only so much out of the idea that the meaning of words is always
shaped by the purposes for which they are being used. Why do
words in fact seem more solid than this? What gives them the false
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objectivity on which legal formalism, for example, depends? To answer these questions one has to explore the ways that words are a
part of the social construction of reality. Consider the cluster of
meanings that surround the word "woman." To understand how
sexist assumptions are incorporated into, and reproduced through,
ordinary language usage, one has to think about the "forms of life,"
the "language games," the "structures of social reality," that speak
through us when we "use" words. A lot of the most interesting critical legal studies work concentrates on making these conceptual
structures visible, partly in an attempt to answer the question that I
posed earlier-what are the structures that give social relations with
no necessary form, or words with no essential meaning, their appearance of determinacy and necessity, their false objectivity?
The ironic significance of Wittgenstein's work is that it gives one
some of the tools to answer this kind of question, but it also gives
one the tools to undermine those same answers. I may claim that
judges who operated within a belief structure called "classical legal
thought" would feel compelled to frame an issue in a certain way,
but if we want, we can demonstrate the incoherency of the concept of
"classical legal thought" as easily as Wittgenstein can show that
there is no core meaning to the word "game."
Thus, in trying to connect and compare Wittgenstein with the
work of structuralists such as Levi-Strauss, who have been so influential on critical legal scholarship, Stephen is actually doing more
than criticizing structuralism. He is carrying on a part of Wittgenstein's project that Wittgenstein, himself, mentioned but then neglected-the investigation of the politics of language and of
thought, the ways that "the limits of my language are the limits of
my world." So, if the connecting theme of this Symposium is the
notion of "false necessity," the Articles written by Stephen Brainerd
and Judy Harris can be seen as explorations of this theme as it appears in language, and in the very conceptual structures that we use
to explain or criticize the social world. Stephen's piece is both a
critique, and a critique of the method of critique itself.
But I can't simply stop here. Having used my description of Stephen's Article to raise one of the central problems in any theoretical
enterprise it would be a tiny bit disingenuous to just leave it hanging
there. So what does happen when you turn the critique on itself?
And how do the. Articles in the Symposium deal with, or dissolve
this question? One possibility is a lot of wailing and gnashing of
teeth, a little high IQ whining, and a quietistic, apathetic approach
to life and thought. "Nothing is certain, so it's certain I will do
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nothing." That kind of thing. Alternatively (taking the approach
beloved of some law and economics devotees), one can struggle
desperately to find some new, and temporarily comforting, source
of "objectivity." It seems to me that the Articles in this Symposium
have rejected both of these approaches. If I say instead that they
can usefully be understood as attempts to construct some kind of
"local theory," you shouldn't think that I am either specifying some
unified method, or claiming that we can create objective descriptions of localities and particulars but not of generalities and
universals.
By local theory, I mean several things, I suppose. There is the
notion that by setting the theoretical issue up as an epistemological
problem, we are being reductionists. There is just more to it than
that. Take Mary Joe Frug's Essay. If we imagine that her aim is to
circumvent or overcome and "epistemological problem" then there
would be no point to her creation of, and argument with, different
"readers," whose "reactions" to the piece deepen and contextualize
her discussion. There would be no point because you cannot get
around the epistemological problem of indeterminacy by multiplying
your structures of analysis or explanation; the problem reappers in
each one. But look at what is actually happening. It does seem to be
true about the world that there are different groups of people with
radically different "frames of reference," or what you will, that those
people will approach her ideas in very different ways and that, by
exposing the exclusion of still another "frame of reference," a
gendered perspective, she is doing something useful. If our conception of an epistemological problem blinds us to the way in which her
work is "better" than a mere lament about the impossibility of saying anything, then it seems that it is our notion of epistemological
problems that is faulty. By dividing the world up into Objective
truth and Subjective error, it excludes both the way that we actually
think-using mulitple, contradictory structures for explaining what
goes on-and the fact that it is important to "rediscover" the voices
that have been completely excluded from the accepted way of discussing things.
K.C. Worden's Article provides an excellent example of this idea
of the tasks of theory-she tries to expose, even if in a partial and
incomplete way, the suppression of the "female voice" in legal education. But K.C.'s work also exemplifies another possibility opened
up by the idea of local theory, the use of microphenomenologiescontextualized descriptions of some social or institutional setting.
Again, if we cast things in epistemological terms, such an exercise
does not make our theory "objective" by measuring it against the
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"facts," because there is no such thing as a pure description of
"facts." Yet the need to convey the context of the criticism introduces new levels of complexity to what is going on, demonstrates
the absurdly exclusionary character of the scholarly style, and produces the "exceptions" that cause her to challenge and refine her
own thesis. This is not Karl Popper's notion of falsifiability, (thank
goodness). But the existentialist, feminist, and phenomenological
traditions of thought, the skeptic's injunction to "cherish your exceptions," and a desire to tell stories about what happens in the
world, with the intention of changing it, seem to me to add up to
something that is not a reconstitution of objectivity, but is worthwhile. Like Mary Joe's Essay and, in a sense, like all of the Articles
in the Symposium, K.C.'s Article is not trying to create some
method that denies contingency, but instead to expose the arbitrary
exclusion of other voices-voices that haven't even been given the
chance to confront their own contingency, because they haven't been
heard at all.

